Ignorance of the problem

xxx

---double!---

[=>unnoticed] Schiffer overlooks Austin's definition 

xxx ... Austin // Alston // Schiffer ... xxx 

Austin's claim that illocutionary acts are conventional acts at least commits him to this: a kind of act X is a kind of illocutionary act only if there exist certain conventions such that (primarily) by virtue of these conventions the performance of certain sorts of non-conventional acts (e.g., uttering sounds of a certain type) by certain sorts of persons in certain sorts of circumstances is constituted an instance of X-ing. This, together with Austin's apparent suggestion that illocutionary acts are conventional acts in the same way that kicking a goal is a conventional act (ibid., p. 106), suggests that Austin thought illocutionary acts are made possible by conventions or rules of the type which Rawls and Searle have called "constitutive rules".

I believe that it is false that illocutionary acts are conventional acts in the sense intended by Austin. Perhaps there are some speech acts--e.g., an umpire putting a runner out by uttering 'Out I'--which are conventional acts in the sense intended by Austin, but these are very special cases and of peripheral interest only; and I would agree with Strawson that in the majority of cases "it is not as conforming to an accepted convention of any b kind (other th~h those linguistic conventions which help to fix the meaning of the utterance) that an illocutionary act is performed." (Schiffer 1972, 91)

If "illocutionary act" are defined in the way Austin defines them, as being 'conventional' in the present sense, then it is logically true that "illocutionary acts" are conventional in the present sense. Then consequently, Schiffer's objection actually amounts to nonsense, assuming a premise which is necessarily and obviously false. The mistake Schiffer commits is to not to apply Austin's definition. Schiffer claims that Austin did not define the term at all: this (false) belief seems to be the reason for his fault. Instead of assuming Austin's definition in Austin's text, Schiffer apparently applies another definition--one according to which most if not all  "illocutionary acts" are just cases of speakers' meaning something in making an utterance (i.e., they are not conventional in the present sense).