We argue that the central terms of "speech act theory" are "polysemic", and are still subject to further "polysemization". What do these terms refer to?

 

 

"Polysemy" and "polysemization"

 

For an expression to be "polysemic" is for it to have more than one meaning. The "polysemization" of an expression is the enrichment of its semantics by the addition of alternative meaning(s). Here is an example. In normal language, the term "logical truth" expresses 'truth by virtue of the laws of logic, rationality'. If we define that term, for example, as 'truth by virtue of the rules of a calculus', then we add another meaning to it and thus polysemize it, make it polysemic.

 

 

"Polysemization", ambiguity and vagueness

 

As a result of "polysemization", an expression usually gets ambiguous (or  more ambiguous than it already was before). After the re-definition just mentioned, the term "logical truth" will be ambiguous. Polysemization may also cause vagueness--when the meanings attached to an expression are no longer (kept) separate.

 

 

Precision and clarity

 

Scholarly work should usually be as clear and precise as possible. Accordingly, scholarly terms should be clear and precise. The polysemization of scholarly terms, however, causes (increase of) ambiguity and vagueness of these terms. It thus furthers ambiguity and vagueness in scholarly work involving these terms. Ambiguity and vagueness, in turn, further have fatal consequences for scholarly work and communication. 

 

 

.......................

 

 

Misunderstanding

In their debate about how the performance of an "illocutionary act" is achieved, Bach & Harnish on the one hand, and Searle on the other, apply different definitions of "illocutionary acts":

(a) Bach & Harnish use "illocutionary act" for attempts at communication (aiming at the audience's understanding of what is being expressed).

(b) Searle uses "illocutionary act" for the creation of certain institutional facts (facts whose existence goes back to constitutive rules).

Clearly, communicative intentions do not involve the creation of institutional facts, and vice versa. So the two parties are using the term "illocutionary act" for different kinds of things. However, neither party is aware of this. 

Now Searle argues that "illocutionary acts" succeed by virtue of the satisfaction of a constitutive rule. Bach & Harnish deny that constitutive rules play anay role. The argue that, instead, "illocutionary acts" succeed just by making the audience understand what is being expressed. Quite clearly, Searle is talking about the creation of institutional facts (which is what he calls "illocutionary acts"); Bach & Harnish, however, are thematizing attempts at communication (which is what they call "illocutionary act"). Their claims do not contradict each other. Rather, they are talking about different things --namely, the two different kinds of things for which they, respectively, use the term "illocutionary act". The debate they are leading has no actual subject, it is perfectly futile. (For the details click here.)

 

[...] 

 

.. To see this, just carefully check different encyclopedic entries.

 

 

(+) Reasons for the polysemization of "illocutionary act" [AUSLAGERN!]

 

On the page, "Extreme polysemy of 'illocutionary act'", you find numerous analyses which show that the definitions and descriptions of "illocutionary acts" given by the different "speech act theorists" are very different--meaning that they have very different opinions about what terms like "illocutionary act"and "speech act" actually mean, and what "illocutionary acts" and "speech acts" actually are (supposed to be).

 

That the term "illocutionary act" has so many different meanings is because after its introduction by JL Austin, the term was subject to a long chain of re-definitions, explicit or inexplicit, deliberate or unintentional. Each of these re-definitions contributed to an ever growing polysemy of these terms--i.e., to an ever increasing amount of ambiguity and vagueness.

 

 

(=>) Reasons: careless or even arbitrary usage, (re-)definition

 

That the ambiguity and vagueness of terms causes such problems is by no means a necessary truth. It is a truth by contingent matters of fact. In particular, it is due to the contingent fact that philosophers (including distinguished ones) are unable to adhere to sensitive rules of the proper definition and use of terms.

 

Meaningful terms should (in the absence of strong reasons to the contrary) of course be used with the meaning that applies to them, and defined as having that meaning. For if they are used or defined otherwise, this will obviously render them polysemic (or more polysemic than they already are), which spoils their suitability for clear and precise communication. (Notice that clarity and precision is the very task for whose accomplishment they are used at all.) But as a matter of fact, philosophers's use and definition of terms tends to be rather careless, indeed, often even arbitrary--with the consequence that scholarly terms regularly do become polysemic. 

 

One nice example is Frege's definition of the term "Bedeutung" for the extension of an expression (in "Über Sinn und Bedeutung", 1892). In the following of this (inadequate) definition, some of the most prominent philosophers of language misinterpreted Frege as suggesting an extensional theory of meaning (while his theory of meaning really is intensional; it is his theory of "Sinn"), and started discussing a this theory in extension, even though Frege never propsed it. The cause of these, and various other, misunderstandings is that Frege defines the term "Bedeutung" quite inadequately: In fact that term refers to an expression's meaning, not to its extension. The 'complexity' which Freges terminological mistake brought in, apparently overstrained the thinking of philosophers such as WVO Quine and D Davidson (who do mistakenly ascribe that extensional analysis of meaning to Frege). [REFERENCE/LINK]

 

 

What is the problem with polysemy?

 

In natural language, polysemy is a common, and usually harmless phenomenon. In scholarly language, however, polysemy is a fatal drawback. Why?

 

 

 

[zusammenlegen mit Vorigem]

 

Polysemy causes ambiguity and/or vagueness

 

The purpose terms serve in academic work is to capture, as clearly (precisely and unambiguously) as possible, certain thoughts/ideas.

 

In order to perform this task, terms must have a clear, precise, and unambiguous meaning themselves.

 

Should a term be vague, then statements containing it would be vague accordingly, and if it were ambiguous, statements containing it would be ambiguous accordingly.

 

Example 1: The word "bank" is ambiguous (at least) between three senses:

(a) 'bench in a park';

(b) 'financial institute';

(c) 'slope bordering a river'.

The sentence "Banks are material objects", accordingly, is ambiguous between the following three meanings: 

(A) 'Benches in parks are material objects';

(B) 'Financial institutes are material objects';

(C) 'Slopes bordering a river are material objects'.

 

Example 2: The term "speech act" is vague, leaving the following questions unanswered:

(a) Do "speech acts" necessarily involve the utterance of words?

(b) Does the success of a "speech act" necessarily involve successful communication? 

(c) Does the performance of a "speech act" necessarily involve the invocation of constitutive rules?

Due to this vagueness, it is impossible to decide over the truth or falsity of any of the following sentences:

(A) "Speech acts necessarily involve the utterance of words."

(B) "Speech acts necessarily involve successful communication." 

(C) "Speech acts necessarily involve the invokation of constitutive rules."

 

Polysemy involves either ambiguity or vagueness (or both). If and insofar a term is polysemic, it is unfit for efficient academic work.

 

 

 

 
 

Fatal consequences (--general--)

 

o ambiguity

o vagueness

o lack of clarity

o (mutual) misinterpretation (Schiffer @Austin, 'not conventional')

o ambiguous vague, unclear talk

o talk at cross-purposes ('how "performatives" work ...')

 

xxx ......

 

 

 

 

 

=> ambiguity 

=> vagueness

 

...

 

=> lack of clarity

=> ambiguity of communicative content (Strawson: "illocutionary acts are not conventional")

 

...

 

=> faulty usage, faulty definition, unjustified re-definition

=> misinterpretation

=> pseudo-debates (fruitless)

=>