The extreme polysemy of "illocutionary act"
The variety of terms used in characterising "illocutionary acts"
The term "illocutionary act", and the extension of this term, is often defined and/or explained in such terms as "the securing of uptake" (i.e., the understanding of what act is performed), "conventional" (rather than "natural") states of affairs, the "doing of an action", and "infelicity" (as by JL Austin). But "illocutionary acts" and "speech acts" are also often defined and/or explained in terms of "constitutive rules", "illocutionary force" and "illocutionary point", as well as in terms of "preparatory" conditions, "propositional content" conditions, "sincerity" conditions and "essential" conditions (these terms are applied in J.R. Searle's approach). Alternatively, definitions and explanations of "illocutionary acts" often refer to communicative intentions, the expressing of an attitude, and to an intention's communicative success, or, alternatively, to a person's "meaning something in making an utterance", or their "meaning something by an utterance". (Such terms are used, for example, by P.F. Strawson and S. Schiffer, as well as K. Bach & R.M. Harnish.) Furthermore, "illocutionary acts" are also often defined and/or explained in terms of linguistic actions, such as the act of "saying something", and in terms of linguistic (or proto-linguistic) rules and conventions. (Such notions appear, for example, in W.P. Alston's theory.) In addition, there are numerous other ways of defining "illocutionary acts". Moreover, single elements of the accounts just introduced are often combined.
The variety of definitions given of "illocutionary acts"
As different as the sets of terms are by which "illocutionary act" and "speech acts" are defined and/or characterised, as different are, indeed, the definitions given of these terms. Here is how some of the leading "speech act theorists" characterise them.
William P Alston (1964, 2000) applies the term "illocutionary act" to acts of saying something (in a peculiar sense of 'saying', which refers to linguistic behaviour, behaviour following semantic rules.
S. Schiffer (1972), uses the term "illocutionary act" for cases of "meaning something", in a sense which does just not presuppose the existence of linguistic meaning.
When J.L. Austin (1962) originally hit upon what he then called "illocutionary acts", what he found most striking about certain acts is that they create "institutional facts" (facts whose existence is based on the collective recognition of their existence), and that they do so by means of successfully communicating that the act is (being) performed (by "securing uptake", as he famously put it).
K. Bach & R.M Harnish (1979), in turn, define the "illocutionary act" as a piece of behaviour governed by communicative intentions--seemingly, without including the communicative success of that intention within the act. According to their definition, the creation of any "institutional facts" is not included. ... At least with the "communicative" illocutionary act; because ...
K. Bach & R.M Harnish (1979) also introduce a second, quite different variety of "illocutionary act", whose performance involves no communicative success, and no communicative intention, but which instead consist purely in the creation of an institutional fact.
J.R. Searle's (1969) famous approach counts as the classic formulation of a complete theory of "illocutionary acts". However, while the material Searle provides contains highly interesting discussions, as a theory of "illocutionary acts" it is at best a sketchy outline. Searle offers no definition of the "illocutionary act". Instead, he suggests a programme along the lines of which, he believes, a definition can be developed. His own attempt at executing this programme, however, remains rudimental. Even worse, the material he collects in the partial execution of the programme shows clearly that the programme is aporetic, cannot possibly succeed. Among other things, Searle postulates that the "illocutionary act" is the minimal unit of communication, but also, that "illocutionary acts" involve the constitution of institutional facts"--which is categorically inconsistent. Also, his examples of "illocutionary acts" clearly include acts which, on his own analysis, in fact do not involve the creation of any institutional facts.
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@ambiguous
@imprecise
unclear
Which term/definition is used? Austin's? Bach & Harnish's? Schiffer's?
... *Searle's? And what *is* Searle's definition?
EXAMPLE: What is it for a "silencing" to be "illocutionary"? To prevent meaning? To prevent communication? To prevent the creation of (certain) institutional facts?
[=> xxx] The variety of subjects the term "illocutionary act" is used for
While still being a bit sketchy, this list shows clearly that in the leading "speech act theorists" the term "illocutionary act" is defined in rather different ways. This has a very significant consequence: It means that the leading "speech act theories" give different answers to the question what an "illocutionary act" actually is (supposed to be). To see this, consider the following dichotomies.
o We can perform a linguistic act while not communicating with anyone, and indeed, without intending to communicate with anyone, as when someone sings in the shower, or rehearses a role.
o We can communicate with each other without performing linguistic acts, as when pupils remain silent to their teacher's question, "Who did not do their homework for today?"
o We can create institutional facts without performing a linguistic act, as when we buy a pack of chewing gums from a gumball machine.
o We can create institutional facts without communicating anything, as when someone writes a will and puts it in their deskdrawer--where it is never found subsequently.
o We can create institutional facts even without intending to communicate, as when someone drives too fast on a highway, or steals something.
o Vice versa, we can perform linguistic acts and communicate intentionally and successfully without creating any institutional facts, as when we tell a joke on a party, or act in a play.
(Etc.)
'Communicative intentions', 'successful communication' 'linguistic acts (behaviour)', 'creation of institutional facts', etc., are different kinds of things. Accordingly, to define the term "illocutionary act" as referring to more than one of these phenomena is to let it refer to different kinds of things. Since the leading "speech act theories" do define the term "illocutionary act" as referring to any of these phenomena, respectively, they let the term refer to various different things. So corresponding to the dramatic polysemy of the term "illocutionary act" concerning its meaning, there is a corresponding dramatic polysemy of that term concerning what it refers to, its extension. There is not one phenomenon worth calling, and called, the "illocutionary act": rather, the term refers to many very different kinds of things, depending on whose definition you apply.
We shall refer to this phenomenon as the "polysemization" of the term "illocutionary act".
That a term is being "polysemized" means that its meaning becomes either ambiguous, or vague, caused by its receiving additional meanings.
We believe that polysemization is among the most devastating things which can happen to a scholarly term, and in the following we show that polysemization did happen to the term "illocutionary act", and that this did cause the most fatal consequences.
(=>xxx) Illustration ("bank")
We can compare the question, 'What is an "illocutionary act?', with the question, 'What is a bank?'. This may be answered by different authors as follows:
Author (1) "A company lending, borrowing and/or investing money"
Author (2) "Sloping raised land along the sides of a river"
Author (3) "A building where money is lended, borrowed and/or invested"
Author (4) "row of similar things, especially machines"
etc.
An appropriate analysis of the word "bank" will list these definitions, not as different ways of capturing one and the same thing ("the bank"), but rather as different alternatives, referring to different things. As linguists say, "bank" is subject to polysemy (along with homonymy) in the following two senses:
(1) It has different meanings, is ambiguousy concerning meaning, because people express different ideas by that word on different occasions.
(2) It refers to different things, is ambiguous concerning extension, because people refer to different things by that term on different occasions.
Turning back to the term "illocutionary act", this is subject to polysemy in both respects, too. In the mouth of different authors, that term expresses very diverse ideas. Correspondingly, the term refers to very diverse subjects. There is no such thing as "the illocutionary act". Rather, numerous quite different things are picked out by that term. Attempts at communication, successful acts of communication, the use of linguistic means, the creation of institutional facts, etc., etc.